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THE common law, as interpreted and administered in
the United States, contains anomalies of two kinds-those
which were reasonable enough when they were adopted but
which have survived their usefulness, and those which
never were sustained by sound legal reason, but originated
in some careless or ill-considered expression of a court.
Many instances of both might be pointed out, but the
general progress is undoubtedly towards their elimination,
and the squaring of our jurisprudence with the principles
of logic and common sense, regardless of technicalities.
This progress is, however, so seldom accelerated by the mere
force of logic alone, and so often depends entirely on slow
judicial accretions, that we may be pardoned for calling
attention to an instance in which a perceptible advance in
the right direction was made in American law through the
direct influence of this magazine, and of an able writer
whose forcible exposition of a fallacious assumption of the
courts first appeared in these pages. The question discussed
was as follows:
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A judgment is rendered-mistakenly or irregularlyagainst two defendants, one of whom was not summoned, and
it is allowed to stand unreversed: Is it void as against the
summoned defendant P Can he be sted on it in another
I
State
Massachusetts, in Hall v.
of
Court
The Supreme
2
Williams, pronounced as law a certain doctrine as to
judgments, which has been followed in that State and
in three others, but which is inconsistent with some
earlier and a good many later decisions, and is not now
accepted as law by the two text-writers on judgments,
Messrs. A. C. FREEMAN and H. C. BLACK. Judgment was
recovered in the Superior Court of Chatham County,
Georgia, against two defendants, only one of whom had
been summned, and when an action of debt on the judgment was brought in Massachusetts, the Supreme Court of
that State held that " the judgment being entire, if it is a
nullity with respect to one, it is also in the whole," and
that the summoned defendant had therefore a good defense
in the fact that his co-defendant had not been summoned.
This case was followed in Massachusetts,' Maine and New
Hampshire, and the doctrine was stated as the law in the
first three editions of Freeman on Judgments: "A judgment rendered against persons jointly liable is an entirety,
and if void as to one defendant, is void as to all. If, in an
adtion on a judgment sgainst several joint- defendants, it
appears that one of them was never served with process, the
judgment is considered as a nullity even against the
(Second edition, § 136.) In the American Law
others."
Register for November, i88o, pages 673-690, this doctrine
-1Mistakenly or irregularly rendered. In some States there are statutes
authorizing judgments against two or more joint debtors upon service of
summons on but one, but the discussion may more profitably be confined
to cases of judgments irregularly rendered and without statutory
sanction.
2 6 Pick., 232 (1828).
3 At one time the decisions in that State seemed to indicate a readiness to depart from the case of Hall v. Williams-see in particular
Stockwell v. McCracken, io9 Mass., 84-but the doctrine was reaffirmed
later without qualification.
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was criticized in an article by Mr. FREDERICK J. BROWN, of
Baltimore, and in 1882 Mr. FREEMAN, in a long and carefil note published in the 3 2d volume of his "American
Decisions," at page 604, emphatically rejected the doctrine
of Hall v. Williams. In 1883 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in Hanley v. Donoghue,' followed the "entirety"
doctrine, relying on the New England cases, and in 1885,
that case having been taken up to the Supreme Court of
the United States--on the "full faith and credit" clause of
the Constitution-the decision of the Maryland court was
reversed, Hanley v. Donoghue, i I6 U. S., i, but the Supreme
Court (Justice GRAY delivering the opinion) avoided any
mention of the "entirety" doctrine. Mr. BLACK, in his recent
work on Judgments (published in 1891) at § 2 11, expresses
disapproval of that doctrine, as does Mr. FREEMAIAN again
in the 4th edition of his work on Judgments (1892),
§ 136, where he says that the utterance in Hall z.
Williams was a dictum, and that "the decided preponderance of authorities maintains that a judgment against two
or more is not void as against those of whom the court had
jurisdiction, though void as against others." The learned
author points out, at § 557, that the question was "first
carefully considered and explained" in the American Law
Register's article, and says that "at the present time the
weight of authorities is in conformity with the conclusions
reached in this article."
Those members of the profession who have not the
American Decisions' series within reach may be interested
to read the following discussion of the question in Mr.
FREEMAN'S vigorous note in the 3 2d volume of that
series. It follows in large part the authorities cited in
the Law Register's article, which begin with Motteux v.
St. Aubin, 2 believed to be the earliest decision, that a judgment against two defendants, voidable or void as to one of
them, may yet stand good as against the other, the first
American case cited as adopting this authority being
59 Md., 239.
2 W. BI., 1133 (1777).
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Gerard v. Basse, in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia.'
Mr. FREEMAN, after mentioning "that line of authorities which assert and enforce the proposition that a judgment is an entirety, and if void as against one defendant is
void as against all," says : "This proposition has certainly
been accepted and applied by very eminent judges. We
propose to examine the cases in which it has been distinctly
announced, and examine its foundations for the purpose of
ascertaining whether they are sound either in precedent or
in principle. We believe the first case upon this subject is
that of Hall v. Williams.
This question was very
summaril dealt with. ' The judgment being entire, if it is
a nullity with respect to one it is also in the whole.' This
is all the court thought proper to say upon the subject; and
it is the substance of everything which has been said from
that time down to the present. For authority, the court
relied upon Richards v. Walton.2 Now, this case of Richards v. Walton did not involve any similar question. Nor
did the court volunteer any opinion upon the subject of
void judgments. The court merely determined that a
judgment, when reviewed upon certiorari, must be fflirmed
or reversed as a whole, and cannot be affirmed in part and
reversed in part. We know of nothing which has caused
so much confusion and misapprehension as the failure to
discriminate between voidable and void proceedingsbetween those proceedings which result from an erroneous
exercise of jurisdiction, and those which take place in the
absence of any jurisdiction whatever. Every lawyer knows,
or at least oUght to khow, that the existence of errors which
demand the reversal of a judgment upon appeal or writ of
error, by no means warrants the treatment of such a judgment as void. Yet in Hall v. Williams a judgment was
deemed void in

oto when sued upon as a cause of action,

for no other reason than because it would have been
reversed in toto had any appeal been taken.
1 I Dallas, 119 (1784).
212 Johns., 434.

If,
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as we think, Hall v. Williams and all the subsequent cases
in harmony with it upon this subject, rest upon Richards
v. Walton, and Richards v. Walton is no authority either
way, then so far as authority is concerned, we think there
is substantially none in favor of the position that a judgment void as to one defendant is necessarily void as to all.
If the court in Massachusetts really desired to seek advice
from those in New York, it might have there found decisions directly in point," etc.
Mr. FREEMAN then cites some of the New York cases,
and also Motteux v. St. Aubin, sulra, Gerard v. Basse,
szqra, Silvers v. Reynolds,' and other cases mentioned in the
Law ,Regisler'sarticle; and also cases not mentioned there.
"The authorities heretofore cited show that
the courts of Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire
are fully and perhaps unalterably committed to the doctrine
that a judgment is an entirety, and if void against one of
the defendants is void as to all.

.

.

.

We believe it to

be without any other support than the authority of those
eminent courts, which, through what we conceive to be
either a misapprehension of a prior decision, or of the real
nature of the question in issue, pronounced in its favor.
We say misapprehension of the question in issue, because
the court seemed to treat it as a mere question of error,

and not of power, and to assume that if error was shown
the judgment was void.
" The argument upon one side of this subject
is usually expressed substantially as follows : 'The judgnent is entire, and if void as to one defendant, where there
are several, it is void as to all.'

.

.

.

This sentence is

terse, perspicuous and dogmatic. But is it logical? Is
there anything in a judgment which necessarily prevents
its being enforced against one defendant without affecting
the others? Is there any such personal unity of judgment
debtors as pertains to tenants by the entireties, each of
whom is incapable of acting without the other? There
certainly is not."
12 Harr. (N. J.), 275.
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The Maryland decision which the plaintiffs took up to
the Supreme Court, was a case where judgment had been
rendered in the Court of Common Pleas, Washington
County, Pennsylvania, against A who had been summoned,
and B who had not, in an action for breach of covenant,
and action of debt on judgment was brought in Maryland
against A. It turned mainly upon the "entirety" doctrine
as laid down in Hall v. Williams and the later New England cases-the Maryland Court of Appeals holding that
doctrine to be sound, and deciding in favor of the defendant
because they so held-and the arguments of counsel had
been for the most part devoted to attacking or defending
that doctrine. See the report of the case in 5 9 th Md.,
239, and the citation of authorities, among them of course
Mr. FREEMAN'S very emphatic note in 3 2d American
Decisions, then recently published. There was, to be
sure, one other point in the case as it was presented to the
Maryland court, the point raised by the first count of the
plaintiffs' declaration, " but when this was decided against
them by the Court of Appeals, as the decision on this point
did not raise a federal question, the point was not argued
before the Supreme Court, and was-properly-not considered by them.2 In the Supreme Court the argument of counsel was devoted exclusively to the soundness or unsoundness
of the "entirety" doctrine, the only question left in the case,
apparently, and of course the cases of Knapp v. Abell,3
and Wright v. Aiiatrews, 4 in both of which Judge GRAY
See page 245 of 59 th Md.
2 This

pbint was as follows: Plaintiffs in their first count, demurred

to, declared as on a normal and regular judgment of the Pennsylvania
court-that is, as if both defendants had been summoned. They relied
upon Blake v. Burley, 9 Iowa, 592, in support of the position that one of
two defendants in a judgment recovered (a normal and regular judgment)
may be sued alone-that it is the several obligation of each, as well as
the joint obligation of both. In deciding this point against appellants,
the Maryland court said, rather carelessly, that "both were jointly and
The court evidently
severally liable on the judgments" [judgment].
meant that both defendants were jointly, but neither of them was severally, liable on such a judgment.
3 io Allen, 485 (1865).
4 130 Mass., 149 (1881).
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had delivered the opinion of the court, were among the
authorities cited.
Never, one would think, was a judge more directly
confronted with a line of decisions of his own State, than
was Mr. Justice GRAY on this occasion. We can hardly
come to any other conclusion than that the failure of the
Supreme Court to endorse the doctrine of Hall v. Williams,
after it had been so vigorously assailed by Mr. FREEMAN,
must be taken as indicating a readiness to reject it when
the point comes before them again.
Since that decision, so significant in its silence on the
question, it may be said with some confidence that the
Centirety " doctrine is not now accepted as law, except in
Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Maryland, and
perhaps in New Jersey.'

I In Black on Judgments, . 211, Brockman v. McDonald, 16 Ill., 112,
and Hulme v. Jones, 6 Texas, 242, are cited-and the second case is also
given in Freeman, 4th Ed., 0I36-as supporting the "'entirety" doctrine.
We think, however, that these decisions, the first of which does not rely
upon any of the "entirety" cases, and the second of which cites no
decisions at all, are not properly to be so understood, but that they
merely illustrate the confusion (which Mr. Freeman has pointed out)
caused by the failure to discriminate between judgments which were void
ab it/o, and those which are only irregular enough to be reversed on
appeal, and by the use of terms as applicable to both classes of cases
which properly are only applicable to one class. The cases of Williams
v. Chalfant, 82 Ill., 218,. and Harvey v. Drew, 82 Ill., 6o6, would seem to
show that the Supreme Court of Illinois can so discriminate. The
expression in the last case (which we will not discuss): "No doubt it
was a valid judgment against [A]" may probably be taken as showing
that that court follows the prevailing doctrine of the separableness of
judgments.
Mr. Freeman cites Martin v. Williams, 42 Miss., 21o, as committing
the Supreme Court of that State to the "entirety " doctrine. We think
that Moody v. Lyles, 44 Miss., 121, and Terry v. Curd, etc. Co., 66 Miss.,
394, might quite as appositely be cited to show that that court can make
the distinction between void judgments and judgments againsttwo -which
are only irregular and reversible. In that State there seem to have been
an unusual number and variety of more or less defective or irregular
judgments against two or more in the lower courts, which came up to be
considered by the Supreme Court.
Parisot v. Green, 46 Miss., 747, is something of a legal curiosity.
Supplies having been furnished to a steamboat, the plaintiffs-their
counsel having a vague kind of horse-marine notion of admiralty floating
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The position of New Jersey on the " entirety" question is a peculiar one. The first case is Schuyler v.
McCrea, decided in 1837:' A judgment rendered against
two, when only one was summoned, is not a void but a
valid judgment until reversed; and in Silvers v. Reynolds2
the Supreme Court of that State, citing Motteux v. St.
Aubin and Gerard v. Basse, suiora, decided that a judgment
might be set aside as to one of two defendants and stand
good as to the other. But the case of Mackay v. Gordon, 3
action of debt on a New York judgment in which neither
Silvers v. Reynolds nor Schuyler v. McCrea is cited, seems
to range the New Jersey court on the side of the Hall v.
Williams doctrine. The later case, however, presents the
4
curious fact that Hall v. Williams and Reed v. Pratt,
which seem to be the very antipodes of each otherare cited on the same point, in immediate juxtaposition,
and with equal afiproval. One would have supposed that
Reed v. Pratt would be conclusive in a suit on a New York
judgment. Further, in discussing the demurrer to the
second plea, which raised the "entirety" point, while the
court indicated its approval of that doctrine, it yet decided
the demurrer to that plea adversely to the defendants,
because of what the court regarded as a defective way of
presenting that plea, and finally reached a decision in
in their minds-sued, in assumpsit, in the county court, the two owners
and the boat. judgment rendered against the two human defendants.
Afterwards a suit in chancery to enjoin sheriff and creditors on the
ground that the judgment was void, because (i)the, suit ought to have
been in rem (?) in admiralty, and (2) because of the irregularity arising
from the joinder of ths boat! The court discusses the case, and the contention of void-as-to-one-void-as-to-all, with more gravity than might have
been expected, although remarking that "the allegation that the
steamer '1R. R. Hill,' with Parisot and Dent, were indebted, and the
defendants promised to pay, may excite a smile." The opinion mentions "the case referred to in ii N. H." (sic)--evidently Rangely v.
Webster, ii N. H., 299, not mentioned before, which quotes and follows
Hall v. Williams-but neither the adherents of the ".entirety" doctrine
nor its opponents are likely to derive much aid from this decision.
I I Harr., 248.
22 Harr., 275 (1839).

"'34N. J., 286 (1870).
12 Hill, 64.
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defendants' favor by overruling the demurrer to another
plea raising a different defense. In view then of the fact
that the decision of the "entirety" question does not seem
to have been necessary to the case, and in view, further, of
the court's silence about Silvers v. Reynolds, and Schuyler
v.McCrea, and of the citation of such conflictiing decisions
from other States, it is perhaps best to class New Jersey as
a State in which the point is still in doubt, rather than
with the three New England States and Maryland. There
is a mistake at the end of the report of Mackay v.Gordon,
where judgment "for the plaintiffs" should be "for the
defendants."
The consequences of the "entirety" doctrine being
still upheld in four States, will be as follows: When next
an action of debt on judgment is brought, say in Connecticut for example, against A the summoned defendant,
there having been also an unsummoned defendant B,
against whom judgment was also rendered, then if thejudgment was rendered in Mfassachuselts (etc.), the plaintiff
cannot recover because the judgment was a nullity there,
as the authorities will show, but if the judgment was
rendered in New York, Virginia, Missouri (etc.), or in
Ontario, the plaintiff will recover because, as the authorities
will show, his judgment was valid in the home tribunal.
Or to put it in another way, on such a judgment, if it was
a New York judgment, the plaintiff can recover against A
anywhere, even in Massachusetts, but if it was a Massachusetts or a Maryland judgment, he cannot recover in New
York or anywhere else. As to States " not heard from,"
that is to say States where their highest courts have never
had occasion to decide the "entirety" point one way or the
other-and supposing for the sake of example that Idaho
and Moftana are two such "doubtful States "--on such an
Idaho judgment against A (and B who was not summoned)
the plaintiff would probably recover in an action on the
judgment brought against A in -Montana,because we must
suppose that the Montana court would presume that tihe
Idaho court would hold to be the law what is now shown
to be supported by the weight of authority.
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Would hold to be THE LAW; that is to say not statute
law, of course, but evolved law, a proper result of the principles of the common law. Some of the New England
cases are very misleading in their way of speaking of what
is "the law," and of how proof should be given of what is
"the law" of the State from which the judgment against
A (summoned) and B (not summoned) has come. They
assume very erroneously that "the law" in that other
State cannot possibly be directly the opposite of their own
"entirety" law without being the creation of statute, but
the fact is that "the law" of (say) New York or Missouri
on that slbject, as of Ontario, was evolved, and needed no
statutes to help it into being. The New York Supreie
Court is so well satisfied with the justice of the doctrine
it holds as to say (Reed v. Pratt,') that it "would be to
legalize the grossest iniquity" if the defendants .who
had authorized an attorney to appear for them were allowed
afterward fo escape because their co-defendants had not
appeared, and it may be supposed that that court would
find it easy to hold, iprioi, that the "entirety" doctrine
could never have been evolved-that such law must have
been created by statute! It is quite possible that in three
of the New England States and in Maryland the courts
would still presume that the yet unevolved, or at least
undeclared, law of any "doubtful State" must be the same
as their own. But of course if the summoned defendant
admits, as in the ease of Hanley v. Donoghue, he did
admit by demurrer, that "by the law" of the State where
the judgment was rendered it was a good judgment there
against .him, the admission is just as fatal to him whether
the court takes that admission to be by the statute law or
by the law as evolved and decided.

The assumption that "the law" of another State cannot be different from the "entirety" doctrine of Hall v.
Williams unless it had been made so different by statute, is
rather strikingly exhibited in Knapp v. Abell, sufira. Here
judgment had been rendered in New York against A (sum32

Hill, 64.
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moned) and B (not summoned) and the Massachusetts
court decided that "the judgment [against A] was wholly
void for want of service upon the other defendant," citing
Hall v. Williams, siera, and Rangely v. Webster;' and
after speaking of the absence of proof of "the statutes of
New York," the court says: "We cannot judicially know
or presume that the law of New York upon this point
differs both from the common law and from our own."
But if the court had known of the case of Motteux v. St.
Aubin, and of Reed v. Pratt, and other New York cases,
infra, they might have seen how the law-the common
law-of New York could not only differ from their own,
but also could in so differing be based upon very good
authority.'
It is a rather curious circumstance also that the case
of Wright v. Andrews, sufira, was a suit on a Maine judgment rendered against A who had employed counsel, and
B who had not. The conclusion of the brief decision is
that the "judgment, being entire and unqualified, is,- in the
absence of any evidence of the law of Maine ufion the subject,

void against both." But Maine was one of the three States
which had accepted the "entirety" doctrine, Buffum v.
Ramsdell, 3 and the mere citing of that case would have
been enough to show that the law of that State was the
same as that of Massachusetts.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Hanley v.
Donoghue is also, we think, misleading in its way of
speaking of what is "the law "-or "the laws "-and of
how proof should be given of what is "the law "---or "the
laws'-of the State whence comes the irregular judgment.
The second count of the declaration, after setting forth
the judgment against A (summoned) and B (not summoned), "as by the record [etc.] appears, which said judgI ii

N. H., 299 (1840).

It is true that there were from an early day statutes in New York
authorizing the rendition of judgments against un'ummoned co-defendants, joint obligors, etc., but the doctrine of the separableness of a judgment existed in that State independently of statute.
"55 Maine, 252 (1867).
2
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ment" [remains in force and unreversed, etc.], proceeded :
"whereby an action hath accrued to the said plaintiffs to
demand and have of [Al the said sum of money," etc. The
third count was like the second except for a parenthetical
clause inserted: "whereby-in view of the fact that by the
law and practice of Pennsylvania, the judgment so rendered
against the two [etc.] is in that State valid and enforceable
against [A] and void as against [B], and in view of the fact
that [the time allowed for an appeal had gone by]-an
action hath accrued,"' etc. By demurring to this count the
defendant admitted the truth of what was there alleged,
and as we have just said, the admission was fatal to him
whether he meant to admit that it was by the statute law
or by the common law of Pennsylvania that the judgment
was valid and enforceable.
But did he not also by demurring to the second count
make an equally fatal admission? "Wheieby an action
hath accrued," etc. "Whereby"-that is to say "as a legal
result whereof," because that Pennsylvania judgment was,
according to sound principles-of law as declared in decisions
of authority, not an "entirety," but a separable thing,
good as against A although void as against B. The
demurrer must be held to have admitted this proposition
also. In other words, while the federal question-" full
faith and credit"-was raised with equal distinctness by
both counts, as demurred to, the question of the soundness
or unsoundness of the "entirety" doctrine was raised more
distinctly by the demurrer to the second count, not discussed by the court, than by the demurrer to the third. It
would seem that a distinct utterance on this question
would have been more appropriate than the statement

2

of

the familiar doctrine-and citation of authorities in support
of it-that the courts of this country will not take judicial
cognizance of foreign laws, such as the edicts of the crown
of Portugal (Church v. Hubbart), 3 or of the laws and usages
I Brackets [ ] are used above to indicate abbreviations made for the
sake of greater clearness.
2116U.S.,p.4.
32 Cranch, 87.
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of Turkey (Dainese v. Hale),' but that such foreign laws
"must be proved before they can be received in a court of
justice," also that "the several States of the Union are to
be considered as in this respect foreign to each other," etc.
The summoned defendant having by his demurrer to the
second count impliedly admitted that according to principles of law-and nothing said there about satute lawthe judgment was good against him, one would have
expected the court to say in so many words whether what
was thus admitted to be the law in Pennsylvania was local
and eccentric, and different from the law as generally
received-then and there taking occasion to assert the
soundness of the doctrine of Hall v. Williams-or whether
what was thus admitted to be good Pennsylvania law was
also elsewhere and generally received as good law-then
and there taking occasion to assert the soundness of the
doctrine of Motteux v. St. Aubin, and of the cases decided
in New York, Missouri, etc., and in Ontario.
It is the more to be regretted that the Supreme Court
did not express its approval or disapproval of the "entirety"
doctrine, inasmuch as the singular fact presents itself that
in none of the cases which declare it, until we come to
Hanley v. Donoghue' (except in Mackay v. Gordon, szipra),
is there any mention of any of the opposing decisions, and
in none of thepe is there any mention of the "entirety"
cases. 3

In the New Jersey decision, Hall v. Williams and
Reed v. Pratt are cited on the same point with equal
approval, as we have already said, and with no attempt to
reconcile them, or to discriminate between them. In New
York the decisions are, as Mr. FREEMAN saysI "irreconcilable, but with the majority in number against" the
entirety doctrine. The first case, Green v.Beals, " quotes
1 91 U. S., 13.
2 59th Md.

3The Mississippi case cited above in a foot-note can hardly be considered an exception.
432d American Decisions, p. 6o6.
52 Caines, 254 (1804).
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and sustains Motteux v. St. Aubin, and it is relied upon
and followed in Crane v. French.'

Then comes Holbrook

v. Murray,' which, without mentioning these cases, adopts
the "entirety" doctrine of Hall si. Williams, and then
%come St. John v. Holmes, 3 Reed v. Pratt,4 and Brittin v.
Wilder,' which, without mentioning Holbrook v. Murray
or Hall v. Williams, bring the law back to where it was
before, in line with Motteux v. St. Aubin.
When the case of Hanley v. Donoghue was argued in
the Supreme Court, the latest case cited opposed to the
Hall v. Williams doctrine was Holton v. Towner,6 and
there is a still later Missouri case cited in the 4 th
edition of Freeman on Judgments, Williams v. Hudson ;
and now the very latest case on the subject (we believe)
is again from that State, Boyd v. Ellis.8 It will be interesting to mention these three cases brirfly one after the
other, as they illustrate very well the fact that this principle
of void-as-to-one-but-not-as-to-another applies to a whole
class of cases, not merely to the case where one was summoned and the other not. Holton v. Towner decides that
a judgment rendered jointly against a married woman and
others who are sui juris is not, as to the latter, void and
collaterally assailable, although as to the married woman
it is a nullity. Williams v. Hudson decides that a judgment in a suit commenced and prosecuted against a person
deceased is void as to him, not void as to living defendants.
Boyd v. Ellis decides that a judgment against two persons,
one served with process and the other not, is valid as
against the one served. Add to these the leading case of
Motteux v. St. Aubin, where one of the defendants was an
infant, and Gerard v. Basse-where judgment was entered
on a bond and warrant to confess judgment, executed by
one partner with one seal, in the name and behalf of both,
and on motion the judgment was set aside as to the partner
who did not sign, but held valid as to the other-and we
Wend., i.6r (183o).
A2 Hill, 64 (1841).

'I

Wend., 311 (1828).
320 Wend., 6o9 (1839).

25

5 6 Hill, 242 (1843).
793 Mo., 524 (1887).

.8I Mo., 36o (1884).
a 107 Mo., 394 (1891)
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believe that all the important phases are presented of
irregularly rendered judgments voidable (or void) as to one,
while valid as to another.
To sum up the States whose highest courts are opposed
on the "entirety" doctrine, we have on the one side Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Maryland, and, perhaps, New Jersey; on the other, Arkansas, Georgiaperhaps Illinois-Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Virginia.'
The cases themselves-except a few of those mentioned
in this article-may be found in Black on Judgments,
and in the last edition of Freeman on Judgments.
The position of Ontario on this question, which is the
same as that of the States last mentioned, may be learned
from Bacon v. McBean.2 Suit on a New York judgment
against A and B. Plea that B had not been summoned.
The court (Queen's Bench) decided, per ROBINSON, C. J.:
"The plea sets up as a defense for the defendants a matter
which only concerns one of them," and gave judgment for
the plaintiff.
There are cases in the English reports of suits on
foreign or colonial judgments, but none where the judgment had been rendered against two defendants, one of
whom had not been summoned, and we can only suppose
that when such a judgment comes up, the doctrine of
Motteux v. St. Aubin will be applied to it.3
'_Quaere: Ought we not to add to these last every State whose
highest court, when one of these good-as-to-one-bad-as-to-another judgments came before it on appeal, merely reversed the judgment for the
irregularity, without in terms declaring its adherence to the "entirety"
doctrine, for if the judgment was already an absolute nullity as to both,
what was the use of appealing? If so, probably all or very nearly all,
of the other States would be found ranged against the four or five.
23 U. C. Q. B., 305 (1847).
3The question suggests itself whether a judgment mistakenly
rendered against A, and B who was not summoned, so far merges the

original cause of action as to constitute a defense to a suit brought on
such cause of action in another State. It may arise when such suit is
brought (i) against A; (2) against B; (3)against both. It would seem
that such defense should be held good if such suit is brought against A,
probably, also, if it is brought against both, but that it should not be
held good if suit is against B alone.

